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In recent decades, the role of interna-
tional migration has increased dramatical-
ly in most European countries. The growth 
in migration has made some authors proc-
laim the beginning of a second Migration 
Period that could transform the social and 
cultural identity of Europe. The article pre-
sents an analysis of international migration 
geography in Europe in the last twenty-five 
years. The authors identify the main trends 
in migration, provide migration profiles of 
European countries, and propose a classi-
fication based on the recent changes in the 
migrant stock. Changes in the migrant 
stock (total emigration and immigration) 
reflect the level of involvement in interna-
tional and global processes. They can serve 
as an indicator of a country’s attractive-
ness for both foreigners and the country’s 
citizens. The study shows that European 
countries are increasingly split into ‘immi-
grant’ and ‘emigrant’ states. The authors 
describe spatial patterns of migration. The 
volume and localisation of migration flows 
in Europe are affected not only by cultural 
and historical circumstance, such as a co-
lonial past or a common language. The 
scale of immigrant influx often does not 
depend on a donor country’s demographic 
potential or the level of its socio-economic 
development. The links between the place 
of origin and destination are often more 
complex than it might initially seem. The 
authors stress the importance of a differen-
tiated immigration policy taking into ac-
count ethnic and cultural features of host 
societies. 
 
Key words: immigration, emigration, 
Europe, migration flow, immigration poli-
cy, migration ties 
 
There are different perspectives on 
the situation brought about by a mass 
influx of migrants into Europe, which 
has been observed in recent decades 
and especially the last few years [4; 10; 
12; 17; 21]. We can discuss whether 
the current state is a unique phenome-
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non that does not have parallels in the past of Europe and other regions or 
this happened before and it is a mere reflection of the laws of social devel-
opment. All estimates demonstrate that the scale of international movements 
has increased in recent decades both on the European subcontinent and 
around the world. This is a result of globalisation manifested in an increase 
in growing mobility. 
This article analyses 1990—2015 data on migrant stock (immigration 
and emigration) in European countries. The key method is a comparison of 
data on places of birth and residence, which takes into account long-term 
cross-border movements without totalling annual net migration. This ap-
proach allows for assessing fundamental shifts in the intensity and directions 
of migration flows, excluding — when it is possible — the impact of short- 
and mid-term ‘background’ return and transit migrations. 
The key objectives of this study are to identify steady international mi-
gration trends in Europe, to construct a migration profile of countries, and to 
group them by migration stock characteristics. Special attention is paid to the 
analysis of spatial characteristics of migration flows and assessing the pros-
pects of migration in individual regions and countries of Europe. 
The major statistics sources used in the study are the data provided by 
the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Af-
fairs [7]. 
The new migration wave rising in Europe was shaped by both an influx 
of migrants from other regions of the world and an increase in migration be-
tween European countries having different levels of economic, social, and 
political development. The increase in migration between European states 
was partly closed by the fall of the Iron Curtain — the collapse of the global 
socialist system led by the Soviet Union and the removal of foreign travel 
restrictions in Eastern European states. 
As Russian and international researchers stress [6; 15; 23], the period 
following the 1990s saw the most considerable increase in the number of 
migrants in European countries. This was due to several circumstances. 
Firstly, armed conflicts on the territory of the former USSR and Yugoslavia, 
alongside the enlargement of the European Community and strengthening 
internal European ties, resulted in an increased migrant influx into European 
countries. Secondly, an important factor contributing to the intensity of mig-
ration was the growing transport accessibility of European countries for mi-
grants from poor and war-torn Asian and African countries. In the times of 
Marco Polo and Magellan, the way from Eastern Asia to Europe took 
months and not everyone could overcome its adversities. Today, travelling 
many thousands of kilometres is a mass phenomenon. 
The effect of both the process and result of migration — the latter ex-
pressed in the number of emigrants and immigrants — cannot be interpreted 
as a solely positive or negative factor affecting the socioeconomic and politi-
cal situation in a country or region. Lower and higher (as compared to the 
regional population size) emigration and immigration rates can be consid-
ered as either a positive or negative phenomenon depending on whether they 
are perceived by the majority as having a socially beneficial or harmful ef-
fect [3; 22]. 
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A large influx of migrants can be interpreted as a benefit for a country’s 
economic development. Since the proportion of working age individuals and 
the youth in immigrants is above the national average, immigration stimu-
lates the development of the labour market and consumption [20]. Both fac-
tors contribute to economic growth. At the same time, the level of education 
in migrants is often considerably lower than that of local population, which 
leads to social segregation and additional public spending on the adaptation 
and readjustment of migrants. The ethnic aspects of immigration complicate 
interactions with the host population, cause a rapid transformation of the cur-
rent social norms, and contribute to social tensions. This can be illustrated by 
anti-immigrant rallies in Germany, France, Austria, and some other Euro-
pean countries [26; 27]. 
Mass emigration, coupled with a low immigration rate, has different 
consequences. Migration is usually directed from a territory with lower stan-
dards of living to regions with higher social standards1 [1, p. 151]. However, 
some researchers [9; 11; 16] believe that migrants demonstrate a higher level 
of passionarity defined as an activity manifested in individuals’ eagerness to 
reach a goal (often an illusory one) and their propensity towards fierce 
struggle and self-sacrifice in achieving this goal [5, p. 509]. Indeed, staying 
at home is much easier than exploring the unknown searching for a better 
life in strange lands. Mass emigration makes the source country an inert tra-
ditional society with an unfavourable age-sex structure and a low potential 
for internal transformations. In Europe, typical cases are the Balkan coun-
tries (Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and 
Montenegro) and, to a lesser degree, countries of Southern Europe (Portugal, 
Italy, Greece, and Malta). 
However, mass emigration does not only entail preservation of the 
source country’s backwardness but also provides an opportunity for renais-
sance. Connections with the historical homelands cemented by family bonds 
of millions of peoples can be converted into the investment of financially 
successful members of the diaspora and the economic development of source 
countries [24]. In recent history, a typical case is the phenomenal economic 
growth in China in the 1980—1990s, which was partly accounted for by the 
investment from Huáqiáo — the overseas Chinese [2]. 
Alongside qualitative migration intensity and net migration, it is impor-
tant to consider the geographical direction of migration flows — the coun-
tries with which individual European states have the closest population con-
nections. In the early 1990s, 59 % of all European immigrants were residents 
of other European countries. Despite the fall of the Iron Curtain and the sig-
nificant enlargement of the European Union — which shaped the common 
European labour market — this rate has not increased, on the contrary, it 
dwindled by several percentage points2 (fig. 1). 
                                                     
1 An exception is temporary labour migration to regions with unfavourable living 
conditions and high salaries, as was the case in the Soviet period during the reclama-
tion of most of Siberia, Far East, and the European North of Russian.  
2 According to the UN, in 2015, 53 % of European immigrants were residents of 
other European countries. 
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Fig. 1. Migration stock in Europe from different regions of the world (% of the total 
number of immigrants) 
 
Compiled by the authors based on [7]. 
 
Nevertheless, emigration from European countries is primarily restricted 
to the continent. As of 2015, more than two thirds of European-born emi-
grants lived in a different European country. Since 1990, this figure has in-
creased by ten percentage points. 
The most intensive migration exchange is observed between states that 
share a land border and have a common historical background. When these 
factors are accompanied by ethnic and linguistic affinity, reciprocal move-
ments dominate the international migration connections of the neighbouring 
countries. 
Whereas in the forty European states under consideration, migration be-
tween neighbouring countries accounts, on average, for 36 % of total migra-
tion3, in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, this rate is much higher. The 
highest intensity of migration between neighbours is characteristic of the 
three post-Soviet countries — Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. In Belarus, 
87 % of the residents born beyond its borders arrived from the neighbouring 
states4, in Russia and Ukraine, this rate is 70 and 82 % respectively. This also 
holds true for emigration — 79, 65, and 66 % of emigrants born in Belarus, 
Russia, and Ukraine respectively live in the neighbouring countries. 
In different countries and regions of Europe, the geography of migration 
connections is shaped by their history. In the European states that once had 
large dominions, most immigrants come from the corresponding countries. 
                                                     
3 Including 33 % of immigration stock and 40 % of emigration stock. 
4 For instance, Russia accounts for 63 % of all immigrants in Belarus. 
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Most UK immigrants originate from the former colonies in South Asia (In-
dia, Pakistan. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka); French immigrants — from North 
Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia); Dutch — from Indonesia, Surinam, and 
the Antilles; and Portuguese — from the country’s former African colonies 
(Angola, Mozambique, Cabo-Verde, and Guinea-Bissau). Residents origi-
nating from former colonies account for 54 % of all immigrants in the UK5, 
50 % in France, 54 % in Portugal, 37 % in Spain, and 21 % in the Netherlands. 
In other European countries, which did not have large colonies in the past, 
most immigrants are of Middle Eastern origin. In Germany, which pursued 
an active policy in the Ottoman Empire and Iran in the 19th/early 20th cen-
tury, individuals from Turkey and the Middle East account for 18 % of the 
immigrants. People of Middles Eastern origin constitute one fifth of the im-
migrants in the Nordic countries. History still determines migration connec-
tions of European states. The table below shows that each large European 
country has a characteristic source country. 
 
Regions of origin and number of immigrants (1,000 people)  
in the largest European countries 
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Germany 12006 18.8 40.8 1.3 1.9 1.7 1.8 4.1 1.1 10.6 17.8 0.1 
Russia 11643 1.4 39.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.1 42.6 15.2 0.0 
UK 8543 20.5 15.5 3.6 5.4 1.5 15.6 10.4 19.0 0.9 5.1 2.5 
France 7784 28.3 6.0 1.0 3.6 36.0 12.2 5.5 1.6 0.1 5.6 0.1 
Spain 5853 20.1 18.5 0.8 37.7 13.2 3.3 3.6 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.1 
Italy 5789 13.4 40.6 1.4 10.6 12.2 6.3 6.5 7.0 0.3 1.3 0.4 
Ukraine 4835 5.9 77.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 11.6 4.7 0.0 
Switzerland 2439 55.6 18.0 2.2 5.7 2.0 3.6 3.9 3.0 0.4 5.2 0.4 
Netherlands 1979 17.0 12.2 2.0 18.3 10.5 5.8 13.6 2.5 1.8 15.6 0.7 
Sweden 1640 27.1 17.3 1.6 5.2 1.8 8.9 8.1 3.1 2.4 24.2 0.3 
European total 76106 18.5 34.5 1.4 6.1 6.8 5.4 4.6 3.7 9.6 8.9 0.5 
 
Compiled by the authors based on [7]. 
 
                                                     
5 This includes the Irish and people born in the countries of pioneer colonisation — 
the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  
6 The Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijani — residents of former Soviet republics — 
account for most immigrants from West Asia.   
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In Russia — a country that is very heterogeneous in terms of migration 
[8] — former USSR republics account for more than 96 % of immigrants and 
77 % of emigrants. In recent decades, Eastern European states were the larg-
est ‘importer’ of migrants to the economically developed countries of West-
ern Europe78. Until 1990, emigration from socialist countries to the West 
was restricted due to political reasons. An exception was the republics of 
united Yugoslavia, whose citizens enjoyed greater mobility rights and had an 
opportunity to move to Germany, Austria, or Switzerland seeking employ-
ment. After the fall of the Iron Curtain in the early 1990s, the situation 
changed dramatically — millions of residents of Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe headed for the West. Today, they account for 30—55 % of all immi-
grants in such countries as Austria, Germany, Italy, Finland, Ireland, and 
Greece. 
Residents of Eastern European states show strong geographical prefer-
ences when choosing a country of emigration. The reasons behind these 
preferences are rather clear. For instance, 79 % of Albanians living abroad 
have chosen two states of South European countries — Greece (437 thou-
sand people) and Italy (448 thousand people). Almost 1.7 million Romanians 
who gained the right to seek employment in EU states without any restric-
tions have chosen linguistically similar Italy (over 1 million) and Spain (660 thou-
sand). These two states and Germany account for 77 % of all Romanian im-
migrants in the EU. The same three countries, although in a different order 
(Spain — Germany — Italy), have become new homes for 53 % of Bulgar-
ian immigrants in the EU [7]. 
Being the economic driver of Europe and having a diversified labour 
market and high living standards, Germany is the most attractive country for 
most Eastern Europeans. This holds true for not only its eastern neighbours — 
Poland and the Czech Republic — but also Hungary, Slovakia, and former 
Yugoslavian republics. Germany has received a fourth of all emigrants from 
Croatia, 30 % of those from Hungary, 40 % from Poland, and almost 60 % 
from the Czech Republic. 
The UK and Ireland are Germany’s major competitors for the position of 
the most popular recipient country. These states were the first to lift all re-
strictions on the employment of citizens of Eastern European states that ac-
ceded to the EU in 2004—2007. In the UK, the number of immigrants from 
                                                     
7 In this cases (and in the table) the term 'Western Europe' refers to the twenty states 
of Western, Nordic, and Southern Europe — Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Spain, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, and Malta. 
8 The term ‘Eastern Europe’ refers to the 20 states of Eastern and Southeastern Euro-
pe, which were defined as socialist countries before the 1990s — Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Romania, Moldova, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montene-
gro, Macedonia, Albania, and Bulgaria.  
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Slovakia, Latvia, and Lithuania is far above that in all the other European 
countries. Moreover, the country has become the second (after Germany) 
most preferred destination for Poles (203 thousand people). 
The choice of new place of residence is not always explained by geo-
graphical remoteness, ethnolinguistic proximity, cultural and historical ties, 
or socioeconomic development. It is easy to explain why Algerian and Mo-
roccan diasporas are the largest in France, Indian and Pakistani in the UK, 
and Turkish and Polish in Germany. It is evident why Spain has become ho-
me to immigrants from Romania and Latin America, alongside Moroccans 
living in the vicinity of this country. Russia’s history determined it close po-
pulation connections with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. 
It is more difficult to explain why many countries of Western Europe are 
populated by large groups originating from the states located thousands of 
kilometres away and having no evident links to their new home.  
Let us consider several cases. In Luxembourg, the Portuguese account 
for 38 % of all immigrants and comprise 17 % of the Grand Duchy’s popula-
tion. However, in the neighbouring states — France, Belgium, and Greece — 
the proportion of the Portuguese is 9.2, 3.1, and 0.8 % of all immigrants re-
spectively. In Belgium, whose population size is 20 and the number of im-
migrants 5.5 times those in Luxembourg, the absolute number of the Portu-
guese is 2.2 times smaller [7]. 
Another case is three Scandinavian countries — Denmark, Sweden, and 
Norway. They have a comparable proportion of immigrants (10, 17, and 
14 % respectively). At the same time, the proportion of immigrants from Sri 
Lanka, which is distant from the Nordic countries in all respects, in Norway 
is 5.7 times as high as in the neighbouring Sweden. However, the number of 
Bangladeshi immigrants in Sweden is 7.3 times that in Norway. In Sweden 
and Denmark, there are large Lebanese diasporas (26 and 13 thousand re-
spectively), whereas only 2,000 representatives of this Middle Eastern nation 
live in Norway. 
Differences in the number and proportion of immigrants from different 
countries of the world are also observed on the largest Western European 
states. The UK, France, Germany, and Italy have never had steady migration 
or any other connections with the Philippines, Thailand, or Afghanistan. In 
the UK and Italy, there are large Philippine diasporas comprising over one 
hundred thousand people, whereas in France and Germany, the proportion of 
immigrants from this country is much lower. The proportion of immigrants 
from Thailand in Germany is 4.2 times that in France and 8 times that in It-
aly. The Afghani who have moved to Europe in recent decades escaping the 
terrors of civil war and have been granted asylum, prefer to settle in Italy and 
the UK. The proportion of the Afghani9 in the total immigrant population in 
these countries is 10—20 times that in Germany and France, where the Af-
ghani population is almost absent. 
                                                     
9 This concerns ethnicity rather than nationality. 
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The above and other similar cases suggest that today, both qualitative 
and quantitative parameters of the immigrant inflow into a European country 
are determined by both the public migration policy and preferences of immi-
grants. The geopolitical and geoeconomic position of certain countries and 
their regions are also important [13]. 
The localisation of international migrants and the intensity of migration 
flows do not always follow obvious geographical patterns, even if the 
movement is restricted to a relatively homogeneous ethnocultural environ-
ment. The recent decades have seen a massive influx of immigrants from 
Latin America into Spain, which is explained by ethnocultural proximity and 
the attractiveness of the former metropolitan state as a country with higher 
standards of living. However, the number of immigrants from different Latin 
American states living on the Iberian Peninsula is seldom correlated with the 
demographic potential of these states. The number of Ecuadorians (422 thou-
sand) living in Spain is 2.3 times that of Peruvians (183 thousand) residing 
on the Iberian Peninsula, although the population of Peru (31.2 million peo-
ple) is twice that of Ecuador. (15.3 million) [7]. 
The assumption that a poor10, semi-patriarchal society has a lower spatial 
mobility or the opposite statement — countries with lower incomes have 
higher migration rates — are not always true. For instance, out of the three 
Central American states, which are comparable in terms of their population 
size — Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras — the least economically de-
veloped Honduras accounts for most immigrants living in Spain. The num-
ber of Hondurans residing on the Iberian Peninsula is 11 times that of immi-
grants from Costa Rica, which is considered an affluent Latin American 
country11 and five times that of the newcomers from poorer and densely po-
pulated Guatemala12. 
The above suggests that the geography of migration connections does 
not always follow a simple pattern, according to which the intensity of mi-
gration flows and the choice of destination country are determined by socio-
economic parameters, a common cultural and historical (or ethnolinguistic) 
background, and transport connections. It is often difficult to determine what 
the initial impulse behind the development of diasporas was. Sometimes it is 
an arbitrary choice of a group of immigrants who learnt about an earlier un-
known ‘promised land’ in Europe. Sometimes the impulse is a PR campaign 
of destination states, which was the case in Finland in the 1990s — the coun-
try granted refugee status to a large group of Somalis [25]. The mechanism 
of the ethnic diaspora development, which is described below is rather typi-
cal and is observed in different countries. 
                                                     
10 Here and below, the adjective ‘poor’ has a purely economic meaning suggesting 
low standards of living.  
11 According to the UN Statistics Division [18], in 2013, the GDP (PPP) per capita 
reached USD 10,200 in Costa Rica, 3,500 in Guatemala, and 2,300 in Honduras. 
12 The population size of Honduras is 8.7 million people, that of Guatemala 16.2 mil-
lion. 
Human geography  
 64
At the first stage, a group of immigrants is granted permanent residence — 
this can be political asylum or any other ‘humanitarian’ mechanism. Later, 
the immigrant community starts to grow with an influx of new refugees and 
family reunions. In modern Europe, the right to asylum and family reunion is 
a basic principle of migration policy. Thus, a developed ethnic community 
becomes a powerful magnet for new immigrants. As a result, large immi-
grant communities are formed ‘out of thin air’. In 1990—2015, the number 
of Somalis living in Finland increased from 54 people to 12.5 thousand. To-
day, the immigrants from this African state are the fourth largest diaspora in 
Finland, the first three originating from the neighbouring states — Estonia 
(51 thousand), Sweden (41 thousand), and Russia (14 thousand). Over the 
same period, the number of Iraqis living in Norway increased 32-fold — 
from 0.7 to 22 thousand people and the Afghani community in the UK grew 
more than 130-fold — from 0.5 to 683 thousand people [7]. 
Studying the localisation of migration flows in Europe and analysing 
their quantitative characteristics allow us to identify the geographical pat-
terns of international migration on the continent and trace the changes that 
took place in this area over the quarter century. 
Despite a more than 50 % increase in the total number of immigrants in 
Europe in 1990—2015, the country-specific growth rates differed substan-
tially. After a series of armed conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia, 
the number of immigrants in the countries of Southeastern Europe increased 
by 40 %, whereas a 2.6-fold growth was observed in the Nordic countries 
and 4.4-fold in Southern Europe13. As figures 2 and 4 show, a decline in the 
number of foreign-born residents took place only in the former USSR repub-
lics (except Russia), Poland, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The most dra-
matic decrease took place in the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), 
Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In these countries, the proportion of 
the foreign-born population reduced 1.6—4-fold over 25 years. In the former 
Yugoslavian republic, this reduction was caused by a civil war, which raged 
for almost four years, and the ensuing ethnic cleansing, whereas, in the Bal-
tics and Moldova, changes in the ethnic composition were peaceful, attained 
through a consistent public policy of ousting ‘migrants’ [14]. A reduction in 
the number and proportion of immigrants took place in Belarus and Ukraine, 
although at a smaller scale14 (fig. 2). 
A reduction in the number of individuals born beyond the current bor-
ders of Poland was accounted for by the natural decrease in the Poles who 
had moved into the USSR after World War II15. 
                                                     
13 The most dramatic growth was observed in Spain, where the proportion of immi-
grants increased almost sevenfold in 1990—2015. 
14 In 1990—2015, the number of persons born abroad decreased by 13 % in Belarus 
and 30 % in Ukraine. 
15 According to different estimates, from two to two and a half million Poles were 
transferred, either voluntarily or involuntarily, from Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania 
to Poland.  
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Fig. 2. European countries that changed their migration profiles in 1990—2015 
 
Compiled by the authors based on [7]. 
 
The number of emigrants increased in most European countries over the 
25 years. The average European increase in the number of individuals living 
beyond the borders of their historical homeland was 21 %. In Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe, the growth was more than twofold16 (see fig. 2 and 4). 
As a result, the divergence between source and destination countries has be-
come more pronounced in Europe in recent decades. The number of foreign-
born persons (immigration stock) is almost twice that of people who have 
left the country for other states (emigration stock) in the most developed 
European states (fig. 3). 
                                                     
16 An exception in the Eastern European trend is two former Soviet republics — Russia 
and Belarus, — where the number of nationals living abroad reduced in 16—17 %. 
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Fig. 3. European countries with an increase in immigration stock, 1990—2015 
 
Compiled by the authors based on [7]. 
 
In a number of Southeastern European states — Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania — one foreign-born resident accounts 
for 10—50 emigrants. The number of immigrants and emigrants is almost 
equal in eight out of the forty European states. This ‘buffer’ zone is changing 
over times — the Nordic and Western European states (Finland, Iceland, and 
Ireland) are rapidly becoming destination states, whereas Eastern European 
countries — Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine — are turning into sources of mi-
grants (see fig. 3—4). 
The geographical patterns of migration connections characteristic of 
most European states emphasise the need to pursue differentiated immigra-
tion policies. It contradicts the idea of a common European approach. The 
common EU principles and rules of immigration legislation do not take into 
account national particularities. In the UK, abandoning the immigration rules 
developed by the European Commission was one of the reasons behind the 
Brexit vote, which stressed the unacceptability of a unified migration policy. 
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Fig. 4. European countries with an increase in emigration stock, 1990—2015 
 
Compiled by the authors based on [7]. 
 
The aggravation of migration situation observed in Europe in recent 
years — a result of a new influx of immigrants from Africa and the Middle 
East — necessitates the development and introduction of new approaches to 
the immigration policy. These approaches should take into account both the 
established migration connections of each European state and the opportuni-
ties for integrating immigrants into local societies. The latter depends on not 
only quantitative parameters of the migration flow but also ethnic and reli-
gious identities. 
The persistence of the above migration trends will inevitably lead to a to-
tal transformation of the European sociodemographic and ethnocultural 
space. From the perspective of world history, these changes occur at a rapid 
rate. In the Decline of the West, Oswald Spengler writes that, as 70 years was 
the lifetime of a man, 1000 years appeared to be the lifetime of a civilization 
[19, p. 269]. However, the rate of all social process has increased signifi-
cantly since the times of Spengler and a transformation of Europe would re-
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quire not centuries but a much shorter period. During the Great Migration, 
which took place in the middle of the first millennium, a change in the eth-
nocultural landscape of the European continent required several centuries, 
today, a similar process is taking place. 
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